Selected Dispatches

Selected Dispatches

Dispatches

The following is a collection of dispatches relevant to the topic. Care should be taken in noting that not all the information enclosed was known to all parties and that some of the coded messages were not deciphered until well after the commencement of hostilities.

 

To: Tokyo Date: 16 Jan. 41

... 2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning of the 16th was as follows: 5 battleships... 5 light cruisers...19 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders...about six small submarines...and three transports. The Yorktown is not in port. The CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the Pennsylvania on 15 Jan. 41.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo Date: 21 Feb. 41

1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on the 13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they will depart again on the coming Wednesday and return on the following Wednesday). Judging from the statements by various sailors who were on these vessels, the training was apparently held in the vicinities of Kauai, Lahaina, and Hilo.

From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Naval Intelligence, Washington
To: alcon Date: 1 Apr. 1941

Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised that because of the fact that from past experience shows [sic] the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches and precautions are in effect.

From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Japanese Foreign Ministry
To: Washington Date: 31 Jul. 1941

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. This is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo- China and to have our troops occupy that territory...

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, by Gordon W. Prange]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu Date: 21 Sep. 41

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: [The message divides Pearl Harbor waters into a number of areas which are delineated.] 2. With regard to war ships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor...tied up to wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor Date: 16 Oct. 41

The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Japanese Naval General Staff
To: alcon Date 5 Nov. 1951

Navy Order No. 1 -- By Imperial Order, the Chief of the Naval General Staff orders Yamamoto Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets as follows:

1. Expecting to go to war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands early in December for self-preservation and self-defense, the Empire has decided to complete war preparation.

2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

3. Its details will be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu Date: 15 Nov. 41

As relations between Japan and the United States are more critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Washington date: 19 NOV 1941

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short-wave news broadcast:

1) In case of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZE AME ("east wind rain")

2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITA NO KAZE KUMORI ("north wind cloudy")

3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE ("west wind clear")

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. Forward as urgent intelligence.

From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Washington Date: 20 Nov. 1941

There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you-twenty- ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.

[From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor Date: 24 Nov. 41

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: War Department, Washington
To: Army Hq. Hawaii Date: 27 Nov. 1941

War Department Msg No. 472 -- Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at nay moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures shout be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [the Army's basic war plan] so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Navy Department
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor Date: 27 Nov. 41

This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: War Department, Washington
To: Army Hq. Hawaii Date: 28 Nov. 1941

War Department Message 482 -- Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities...Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of you establishments, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect you responsibility under existing instructions.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu Date: 29 Nov. 41

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movement, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor, alcon Date: 1 Dec. 41

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements tot he south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Washington Date: 2 Dec. 1941

Take great pains that this does not leak out. You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy each of the O[pa-k2] and the L[LA] codes, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the codebooks for communication between the three departments [HATO] and those for use by the Navy).

2. As soon as you have completed this operation wire the one word HARUNA.

3. Burn all secret records of incoming and outgoing telegrams.

4. Taking care not to arouse outside suspicion, dispose of all secret documents in the same way.

Since these measures are in preparation for an emergency, keep this within your consulate and carry out your duties with calmness and care.

[From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu Date: 2 Dec. 41

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force Date: 2 Dec. 1941

This force is already in the anticipated scouting areas from Kiska and Midway Islands. Tonight we will pass the 180 degree line and near the enemy zone. More strict air alert and strict lookout against enemy ships suspected of tracking us will be maintained. Particular attention will be paid not to reveal any light at night and to limit blinker signals as much as possible.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Tokyo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force Date: 2 DEC 1941

Climb Mount Niitaka.

[From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force Date: 3 Dec. 1941

1. It has already been ordered to go to war on 8 December, but so critical has become the situation in the Far East that one can hardly predict war would not explode by that time. So far no new information on Hawaii area received and also no indications of our Task Force being detected. But since the enemy intention is naturally far beyond prediction, strict attention will directed to meet any unexpected encounter with an enemy.

2. It is intended that this force will operate as scheduled even if war breaks out before 8 December..

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo Date: 4 Dec. 41

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th...

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo Date: 5 Dec. 41

1. During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message [previously] arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

3. The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu Date: 6 Dec. 41

Please wire immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo Date: 6 Dec. 41

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four of five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickham, Ford, and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets...

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo Date: 6 Dec. 41

The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th: 9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

[From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret)]

 

From: Tokyo
To: Washington Date: 7 Dec. 1941

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

[From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: Gen. Marshall
To: alcon Date: 7 Dec. 1941

Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately STOP Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly STOP.

[From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David Kahn]

 

From: USS WARD
To: Commandant 14th Naval District Date: 7DEC41 0654 local

We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges on a submarine operating in the defensive sea area.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Radio Communication Station, Hawaii
To: alcon Date: 7 Dec. 1942

Air raid. Pearl harbor. This is no drill.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange

 

From: Adm. Nagumo
To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force Date: 7 Dec. 1941

Brilliant success was achieved for our country through the splendid efforts of you men. But we still have a great way to go. After this victory we must tighten the straps of our helmets and go onward, determined to continue our fight until the final goal has been won.

[From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Gordon W. Prange